One of the country's leading legal philosophers collects a series of essays (most originally appearing in the New York Review of Books) which examine the ... basis for the United States Constitution, and attack the "original intent" interpretation, most famously spouted by Bork.

The book's strength is Dworkin's accessible writing style (which may stem from the popular press origins of most of these essays) and his tight analysis of several cutting edge issues--abortion, affirmative action, free speech, as well as some historically important battles--the Bork and Thomas nominations.

His bottom line is (although he does not say this explicitly) that the recent Supreme Court, abbeted by a series of Republican presidents, has begun a revolution in legal thinking which rejects the 200 year old liberal tradition of judicial interpretation, and in the process has substituted results based, conservative politics for any semblance of judicial reasoning.

The weakness of the book is that many examples and arguments are repeated between essays, covering the same ground in virtually the same words from different times.

A much easier read than "Taking Rights Seriously", although the latter clearly is a more complete exposition of Dworkin's philosophy.

For a counter argument, see any of Judge Posner's recent work, which explicitly takes on Dworkin's philosophy.

Ronald Dworkin is perhaps today's Bentham. His views on Constitutional Interpretation in this book are so vividly written and lucidly explained. His views on Judicial Activism equating it with natural interpretation are worth considering if not fully acceptable.

Since this book consists of occasional pieces collected under a common rubric, it's persuasive thrust will find its target in a readership that is already sympathetic to Dworkin's legal and political philosophy. The arguments are not finely made, as they are in, say, *Taking Rights Seriously*, or in *Life's Dominion*. Many of the illustrative parables he uses, he's used before. That being said, *Freedom's Law* is a good collection highlighting the contours of Dworkin's fundamental objections to legal positivism. I think it is possible to follow Dworkin's non-interpretivist method without arriving at the same(moral)conclusions. But if you aren't already familiar with Dworkin's intellectual base of operations, a better place to start would be *Taking Rights Seriously* (easy to find) or, even better, his early and very important essay, "Is Law a System of Rules?" reprinted in *The Philosophy of Law* ed. by Dworkin (harder to find). To his credit, in this latter collection, he gives ample space to views contrary to his own, such as Hart's positivism, and Finnis' moral arguments against abortion.